Hill, in “Ideas of Human Excellence and Preserving the Natural Environment”, makes the intriguing claim that what truly drives an environmentalist's indignation at the destruction of nature is what such an action reveals about the individual undertaking it. To Hill, those who destroy nature lack an appreciation of their status as natural beings and their place as a minute aspect of a larger universe. Thus, he seems to be saying that arguments about the “intrinsic” worth of nature are somewhat missing the point, as what people really care about is the reflection of their own values.
This does make me question my own attitudes towards nature. I personally tend to believe that nature has intrinsic worth regardless of what us humans think of it. But how can I make this judgment in a fair way? Isn’t any opinion of mine a reflection of my own beliefs and attitudes towards a thing? How can anyone, for that matter, say that nature has “intrinsic” worth without revealing their own values about the environment? Put another way, is there any way to decouple judgments about the worth of nature from our own opinions on it?
I do believe that people generally act for ultimately selfish motives. The classic example of an individual volunteering mainly because it makes them feel good, rather than for some truly altruistic purpose, comes to mind. And this doesn’t strike me as a bad thing. So perhaps it isn’t necessarily less meaningful that people would primarily be against the destruction of nature because it clashes with their personal ideals of what constitutes a moral person, rather than it clashing with the “intrinsic” worth of nature.
I still intuitively believe that the intrinsic worth of nature argument feels more morally powerful than the argument that Hill is making. I think I will need to continue questioning whether I can make that argument in good faith, however, knowing my own biases and motivations towards making it.
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